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ESTELLE MARRION BROWN, Respondent, v. ROSE M.
JENSEN et al., Appellants.
[1] Trust Deeds-Remedies-Foreclosure.-Under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 726, there may be only one action for recovery of a debt
secured by trust deed, which action is one of foreclosure, and
compliance must be had with the conditions of the chapter
in which § 726 appears.
[2] !d.-Remedies-Action on Debt.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 726,
where the security has been exhausted or rendered valueless
through no fault of the mortgag·ee or beneficiary under a trust
deed, an action may be brought on the debt on the theory
that limitation to the single action of foreclosure refers to
time the action is brought rather than when the trust deed
was made, and that if the security is lost or has become valueless at time action is commenced, the debt is no longer secured.
[3] !d.-Deficiency-Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580a, 580d Construed.Code Civ. Proc., § 580a, applying fair market value test of
§ 726 to sales made without court assistance under power of
sale contained in a trust deed, and § 580d, declaring that no
judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency on a note secured
by a trust deed where the property has been sold under power
of sale contained in the trust deed, indicate a considered course
on part of Legislature to limit strictly the right to recover
deficiency judgments, that is, to recover on the debt more than
the value of the security.
[4] !d.-Deficiency-Code Civ. Proc., § 580b Construed.-Code Civ.
Proc., § 580b, dealing with a trust deed given to secure to vendor of property the purchase price agreed to be paid by vendee,
is necessarily intended to provide a protection for the trustor
because if it were intended to cover only the situation where
there has been an actual sale of the security under power of
sale in the trust deed, it would be superfluous in view of
§ 580d, which covers precisely that situation in all trust deeds,
whether purchase money or otherwise.
[5] Id.- Deficiency- Code Civ. Proc., § 580b Construed.-The
broad protection provision of Code Civ. Proc., § 580b, for pur[1] See Cal.Jur., Trust Deeds, §52; Am.Jur., Mortgages, § 529
et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trust Deeds, §50; [2] Trust Deeds,
§ 49; [3-8] Trust Deeds,§ 95(2).
41 C.2d-7
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chase money trust deeds stnnds on a reasonable footing; unlike an ordinary trust de<'d and not<' on which only an action
to foreclm;e may he brought under ~ 726, unless the security
has become valueless at time the action is commenced, the
nature of a purchase money trust deed is fixed for all time
when such instrument is executed, and as so fixed no deficiency
judgment may be obtained regardless of whether the security
later becomes valueless.
[6a, 6b] !d.-Deficiency-Code Civ. Proc., § 580b Construed.-If
vendor of realty takes a purchase money trust deed on property at time of its purchase, Code Civ. Proc., § 580b, precluding deficiency judgments following sales under a purchase
money trust deed, is applicable, and vendor may look only
to the security for recovery of the debt.
[7] !d.-Deficiency-Code Civ. Proc., § 580b Construed.-One taking a purchase money trust deed knows the value of his security
and assumes the risk that it may become inadequate, especially
where he takes a second purchase money trust deed, and he is
precluded by Code Civ. Proc., § 580b, from bringing an action
on the note after the security has become valueless because
of sale of the security under first purchase money trust deed.
[8] Id.- Deficiency- Code Civ. Proc., § 580b Construed.-While
Code Civ. Proc., § 580b, speaks of a deficiency judgment after
sale of the security, this means after an actual sale or a
situation where a sale would be an idle act where the security
has been exhausted; the deficiency judgment which cannot be
obtained is still a deficiency judgment even though it may consist of the whole debt, because a deficiency is nothing more
than the difference between the security and the debt.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Thurmond Clarke, Judge. Reversed.
Action on a promissory note.
versed with directions.

Judgment for plaintiff re-

Ned P. Eads and Don D. Bercu for Appellants.
Bertram S. Harris for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment for
plaintiff on a promissory note.
Plaintiff was the owner of real property which, on April
26, 1950, she sold to defendants, Rose Jensen and Leota Trip[6] See Cal.Jur., Trust Deeds, § 86 et seq.; Am.Jur., Mortgages,
§ 857 et seq.
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lett. As a part of the purchase price and on the same day,
defendants executed in favor of Glendale Federal Savings
and Loan Association (hereafter called Federal) a note for
$11,300, secured by a first trust deed on the property. At
the same time, and also as a part of the purchase price, a
second note was executed by them in favor of plaintiff for
$7,200, secured by a second trust deed on the property. Hence
both trust deeds were purchase money trust deeds.
It does not appear from the pleadings or findings how the
first trust deed was "foreclosed," that is, whether by court
action or by the exercise of the power of sale thereunder.
While it is stated simply that the property was ''sold under
foreclosure,'' it appears from the affidavits on motion for a
summary judgment that the sale was under the power of
sale in the trust deed. Neither of the notes had been paid
and Federal had the property sold pursuant to the power
of sale and bid it in for $11,896.63, and a trustees' deed was
thereupon delivered to Federal. Plaintiff made no attempt
to buy the property at the sale so as to protect her second
trust deed.
Plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action on her note,
and to meet the claim that but one action could be brought
on a debt secured by a trust deed, namely, one for foreclosure
(Code Civ. Proc., § 726), alleged that her security (her second trust deed) had become valueless because it had become
exhausted by the sale under the first trust deed. [1] Under
section 726 of the Code of Civil Procedure, there may be
only one action for the recovery of a debt secured by a trust
deed, which action is one of foreclosure. In addition compliance must be had with the conditions of the chapter in
which section 726 appears. One of these conditions is that
any deficiency judgment is limited to the difference between
the fair market value of the property and the amount for
which the property was sold. [2] It has been held under
that section that where the security has been exhausted or
rendered valueless through no fault of the mortgagee, or
beneficiary under a trust deed, an action may be brought
on the debt on the theory that the limitation to the single
action of foreclosure refers to the time the action is brought
rather than when the trust deed was made, and that if the
security is lost or has beeome valueless at the time the aetion
is commenced, the debt is no longer secured. (SecurityFirst Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 31 Cal.App.2d 182 [87 P.2d
724]; Hellman Com.. T. & S. Bank v. Maurice, 105 Cal.App.

196

BROWN

v.

JENSEN

[41 C.2d

653 [288 P. 683] ; Fen·y v. Fisk, 54 Cal.App. 763 [202 P.
964] ; Crescent Lumber Co. v. Larson, 166 Cal. 168 [135 P.
502] ; Otto v. Long, 127 Cal. 471 [59 P. 895] ; Savings Bank v.
Central Market Co., 122 Cal. 28 [54 P. 273]; Commercial
Bank v. Kershner, 120 Cal. 495 [52 P. 848]; Merced Security
Sav. Bank v. Casaccia, 103 Cal. 641 [37 P. 648] ; Salter- v.
Ulrich, 22 Cal.2d 263 [138 P.2d 7, 146 A.L.R. 1344] ; Republic Truck Sales Cm·p. v. Peak, 194 Cal. 492 [229 P. 331] .)
That rule has been applied in favor of a second mortgagee,
the security being considered lost or valueless as to him,
where a first mortgagee forecloses his mortgage and the
property is sold for no more than the senior debt and a deed
has been given. (Savings Bank v. Central Mar-ket Co.,
S1tpra, 122 Cal. 28; Giandeini v. Ramirez, 11 Cal.App.2d 469
[54 P.2d 91] .)
It would appear from the facts here presented that plaintiff has brought herself within those rules and hence section
726 is not an obstacle to her action on the promissory note.
There are, however, add,itional restrictions on deficiency
judgments on secured debts. Defendants pleaded section
580b of the Code of Civil Procedure,* and as seen the facts
here show that plaintiff's second trust deed is clearly a purchase money trust deed. It is urged, however, that inasmuch
as there has not been a sale by plaintiff under her trust deed
within the wording of section 580b, supra, it does not apply.
It is further urged that it does not apply because the security
has become valueless by reason of the sale under Federal's
first trust deed, and the case is not one involving a '' deficiency" as there cannot be a deficiency if there is no security
to sell because it presupposes a partial satisfaction of the
debt by a sale which exhausts the security.
In order to solve this question there must be a further
examination of the code sections. There are other restrictions besides section 726, supra, and 580b, supra. [3] Section 580a applies the fair market value test of section 726
to sales made without court assistance under a power of sale
contained in a trust deed. Section 580d goes further and
provides that no judgment shall be rendered for any defi*"No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real
property for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale,
or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, given to secure payment of the
balance of the purchase price of real property.
"Where both a chattel mortgage and a deed of trust or mortgage
have been given to secure payment of the balance of the combined purchase price of both real and personal property, no deficiency judgment
shall lie at any time under any one thereof." (Code Oiv. Proc., § 580b.)
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ciency on a note secured by a trust deed where the property
has been sold under the power of sale (as distinguished
from a sale in a foreclosure action) contained in the trust
deed. These provisions indicate a considered course on the
part of the Legislature to limit strictly the right to recover
deficiency judgments, that is, to recover on the debt more
than the value of the security. [4] Next comes section 580b,
supra, here involved, which deals with a special type of
security transaction, a trust deed, given to secure to the
vendor of property the purchase price agreed to be paid by
the vendee. That section is necessarily intended to provide
a protection for the trustor because if it were intended to
cover only the situation where there has been an actual sale
of the security under the power of sale in the trust deed, it
would be superfluous. Section 580d covers precisely that
situation in all trust deeds, whether purchase money or otherwise. [5] The broad protection provision (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 580b) for purchase money trust deeds stands on a reasonable footing. A purchase money trust deed is not like an
ordinary trust, deed and note upon which only one action
may be brought under section 726. Under section 726, as
above stated, it is held that whether there is a security is
determined as of the time the action is commenced and if
the security is lost or has become valueless, an action on
the note will lie because the events which caused it to become
valueless were beyond the control of the trustor and were not
contemplated at the time the money was loaned and the trust
deed given. With purchase money trust deeds, however,
the character of the transaction must necessarily be determined at the time the trust deed is executed. Its nature is
then :fixed for all time and as so :fixed no deficiency judgment may be obtained regardless of whether the security
later becomes valueless.
[6a] The question is, therefore, did plaintiff take a purchase money trust deed on the property when it was purchased? If she did, then section 580b is applicable and she
may look only to the security. That is the clear import of
the wording of section 580b. [7] The one taking such a
trust deed knows the value of his security and assumes the
risk that it may become inadequate. Especially does he know
the risk where he takes, as was done here, a second trust deed.
[8] It is true that the section speaks of a deficiency judgment after sale of the security but that means after an actual
sale or a situation where a sale would be an idle act, where,
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as here, the security has been nxhansted. The deficiency
judgment which cannot be obtained is still a deficiency judgment even though it may consist of the whole debt because
a deficiency is nothing more than the difference between the
security and the debt, or, as was said in Carr v. Cleveland
Trttst Co., (Ohio App.) 74 N.E.2d 124, 128 (in dealing with
a case where the sale under the first mortgage produced only
enough to pay it and the effect of a two-year limitation
period for obtaining a deficiency judgment on a mortgage
secured debt against the holder of a note secured by a second
mortgage) : ''But in whatever light we view the proceedings
which took place, either by way of foreclosure or by separate
personal judgment on the note, one fact stands out in bold
relief and that is that a deficiency judgment resulted from
the entire proceedings by reason whereof the plaintiffs are
entitled to whatever benefits accrue from the provisions of .the
deficiency judgment act so-called." [6b] Indeed the purpose of section 580b is that " . . . for a purchase money
mortgage or deed of trust the security alone can be looked
to for recovery of the debt." (Mortgage Guarantee Co. v.
Sampsell, 51 Cal.App.2d 180, 185 [124 P.2d 353] .) The
section states that in no event shall there be a deficiency
judgment, that is, whether there is a sale under the power
of sale or sale under foreclosure, or no sale because the security has become valueless or is exhausted. The purpose of
the ''after sale'' reference in the section is that the security
be exhausted and that result follows after a sale under the
first trust deed.
The foregoing construction of section 580b is further fortified by the last paragraph thereof, sttpra, for it provides
that where a chattel and real property mortgage are given
to secure the purchase price of real and personal property,
no deficiency judgment shall be given at any time under
either of them.
Plaintiff relies on Hillen v. Soule, 7 Cal.App.2d 45 [45
P.2d 349], involving an action on a promissory note secured
by a purchase money trust deed which was inferior to a first
trust deed which was foreclosed and the security thereby
exhausted. It was held that section 580b was not applicable
because plaintiff's action was not for a deficiency judgment
as the security was exhausted and plaintiff had not sold under
his trust deed. That conclusion is out of harmony with the
foregoing discussion. Evidently the factors above discussed
were not called to the court's attention. In the later case
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of Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Sampsell, supra, 51 Cal.A.pp.2d
180, 185, the court states that the security alone may be
looked to for payment of a debt secured by a purchase money
trust deed. However, the result reached in the Hillen case
was correct because the trust deeds there were given in 1927
before the adoption of section 580b (section 580b was added
to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1933, Stats. 1933, p. 1673)
and hence that section could not have been applicable there.
The judgment is reversed and the court directed to enter
judgment for defendants.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., 'rraynor, ,J., and
Schauer, J., concurred.
SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion declares that "section 726 is not an
obstacle" to plaintiff's action on her promissory note, but
it holds that plaintiff's action is one for a ''deficiency judgment" within the meaning of section 580b of the Code of Civil
Procedure and is therefore barred by the terms of that section. I cannot agree with this last mentioned conclusion.
The security afforded by plaintiff's second deed of trust was
extinguished by the sale held under the power of sale in the
first deed of trust. Therefore, there never had been a sale
under the power of sale contained in plaintiff's second deed
of trust.
A reading of sections 580a, 580b, 580c and 580d of the
Code of Civil Procedure makes it entirely clear that the words
"deficiency judgment" are consistently used therein in their
ordinary meaning. They refer to a judgment sought for the
balance allegedly due upon the personal obligation imposed
by a written instrument secured by a deed of trust or mortgage
''following the exercise of the power of sale in such deed of
trust or mortgage . . . '' (Code Civ. Proc., § 580a; emphasis
added) and where "the real property has been sold by the
mortgagee or trustee under power of sale contained in s1wh
a mortgage or deed of trust'' (Code Civ. Proc., § 580d; emphasis added) .
The decisions in this state show that this is the meaning
which has been heretofore given to the words "deficiency
jndgrneut," as u~ed in section 580a. (Hatch v. Secur,ity-Fi1·st
Nat. Bank, 19 Cal.2d 254, 258 [120 P.2d 869]; Bank of
Ameriaa v. Gillett, 36 Cal.App.2d 453, 456 [97 P.2d 875];
see Bank of America v. Hunter, 8 Cal.2d 592, 597-598 [67
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P.2d 99]; Everts Y. Matteson, 21 Cal.2d 437, 448 [132 P.2d
476] .) It is also the common meaning attached to the term
in other jurisdictions. (Phillips v. Union Central Life Ins.
Co., 88 :B1 .2d 188, 189; Bank of Douglas v. N eel, 30 Ariz. 375
[247 P. 132, 133]; Cragin v. Ocean & Lake Really Co., 101
Pla. 1324 [133 So. 569, 135 So. 795, 797] ; Harrow v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 285 Mich. 349 [280 N.W. 785, 788] ;
Tiedeman v. Dorn, 137 Misc. 136 [241 N.Y.Supp. 490, 492493] ; Stretch v. 1llurphy, 166 Ore. 439 [112 P.2d 1018, 1021] ;
Bailey v. Block, 104 'l'ex. 101 [134 S.W. 323, 325] ; 59 C.J.S.
1474.)
Section 580b was originally enacted with section 580a in
1!)33 ( Stats. 1933, pp. 1672, 1673), and the meaning of "defieiency judgment" was undoubtedly intended to be the same
for both sections. \Yhen !Section 580d was added in 1940
( Stats. 1st :BJx. Sess. 1940, ch. 29, § 2), it was again made clear
that ''deficiency judgment'' referred to a judgment sought
for the balance allegedly due a person whose obligation had
been secured by a deed of trust or mortgage and where the
real property had been sold "under power of sale contained
in such a mortgage or deed of trust.'' \Vhile sections 580b
and 580d do overlap to some extent, section 580b cannot be
properly characterized as ''superfluous.''
In 1935 and shortly after the enactment of section 580b,
it was construed with relation to similar facts in Hillen v.
So1de, 7 Cal.App.2d 45 [45 P.2d 349]. It was there said:
''Appellant first contends that this is an action for a deficiency
judgment after a sale under a deed of trust given to secure
the balance of the purchase price of real property, and that
such action cannot be maintained by reason of the provisions
of section 580b of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is a sufficient answer to state that this is not an action for a deficiency
judgment. The security was exhausted by the sale under the
first deed of trust and no sale was had under respondent's
deed of trust. Vve are therefore of the opinion that the
provisions of said section are inapplicable." (P. 47.)
The Legislature has twice amended section 580b since this
construction was placed upon the words ''deficiency judgment." (Stats. 1935, pp. 1806, 1869; Stats. 1949, ch. 1599,
§ l.) As no change was made by these amendments in the
phrase ''deficiency judgment,'' it may be assumed that the
I.Jegislature approved the construction placed on that term in
Hillen v. Soule, supra, 7 Cal.App.2d 45. Purthermore, the
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wording of section 580d as enacted in 1940 also indicates snch
legislative approval.
T!Je evil motivating the Legislature in enacting these sections was that "creditors were frequently able to hid in the
debtor's real property at a nominal figure and also to hold
the debtor personally liable for a large proportion of the
original debt. (Hatch v. Security-First Nat. Bank, supra,
19 Cal.2d 254, 259; see 22 Cal.L.Rev. 170, 180.) The purpose
was not to prevent any recovery where the security had become completely valueless or a senior mortgagee had foreclosed, leavtng no security for the junior debt.
Thus, it appears to me that the majority opinion has
stretched the meaning of section 580b far beyond its terms.
Both seetions 580b and 580d prevent the holder of a purchase
money deed of trust from having a ''deficiency judgment''
after a sale under such a deed of trust. They do not cover
the situation where no sale has been held under such deed
of trust and no "deficiency judgment" is sought. To so construe these sections results in placing the holder of a purehase
money note secured by a seeond deed of trust in a less favorable position than the holder of an unsecured note given for
such purchase money. The Legislature has not so declared.
Until it does so, the courts should not enter the legislative
field by broadening the terms of statutes beyond their common
meaning and contrary to the judicial interpretation which had
been placed thereon prior to the time that the parties entered
into their contractual relations.
The majority opinion relies on Mortgage Guarantee Co. v.
Sarnpscll, 51 Cal.App.2d 180 [124 P.2d 353]. It is sufficient
to state that that case did not present the question herr involved. The broad language quoted by the majority opinion
is mere dictum, unnecessary to the decision of that case.
I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 28,
1953. Spence, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

